4. In this report, we frame the problem of managing spectrum as one about the allocation and governance of an economic resource. While selling exclusive licenses to radio spectrum has been a valuable tool for eliminating conflicting uses and encouraging related investments, it has also contributed to concentrated market structures in wireless telephony and created barriers to entry and innovation. Leaving portions of the radio spectrum unlicensed has created multiple benefits, including encouraging the development of complementary technologies that enhance the effectiveness of devices that use licensed spectrum, triggering the development of alternative technologies that compete with licensed uses, and promoting innovative business models and technologies that have brought unexpected benefits.
5. There is considerable evidence that unlicensed spectrum has huge economic value. Recent past estimates, which already look too conservative, place the value created by current applications of unlicensed spectrum at $16-37 billion dollars a year in the United States alone. 3 However, the primary benefits of unlicensed spectrum may well come from innovations that cannot yet be foreseen. The reason, as we discuss below, is that unlicensed spectrum is an enabling resource. It provides a platform for innovation upon which innovators may face lower barriers to bringing wireless products to market, because they are freed from the need to negotiate with exclusive license holders. Indeed, allocating a mix of licensed and unlicensed spectrum is attractive precisely because the two approaches have diverse advantages in terms of triggering investment and innovation. 4 6. It is sometimes argued that a drawback of leaving bands of spectrum unlicensed is that governments might have to sacrifice the revenue that they could obtain by auctioning spectrum licenses. But it is not at all certain that leaving some spectrum unlicensed would reduce revenue; it might even increase it. The reason is that leaving some spectrum unlicensed reduces the supply of licensed spectrum and, as described later, encourages the development of complementary, demand-enhancing services that raise the economic value of the licensed spectrum networks. 5 7. One recent proposal is that auctions might serve as an effective mechanism to determine the allocation of licensed vs. unlicensed spectrum.
These effects are likely to add significantly to government revenue and could result in higher auction revenue than if all new bandwidth were sold under exclusive licenses. And, even if leaving bands unlicensed were to imply some sacrifice of revenues, that could still be justified if the economic benefit enjoyed by consumers were sufficiently large. Indeed, the types of auctions used to allocate spectrum for licensed use favor putting additional spectrum into the hands of operators with considerable market power, and do not necessarily lead to the lowest consumer prices. 8. The remainder of this report proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the history of spectrum management and unlicensed spectrum uses, particularly the development of Wi-Fi. Section III provides a conceptual framework, based in economic theory, for assessing different approaches to spectrum allocation, and uses that to evaluate the relative merits and roles of property rights versus a regulated commons approach to
The idea is that potential beneficiaries of unlicensed spectrum would submit bids, which then would be aggregated and compete with bids for licensed spectrum. The proposal is akin to asking users of public parks to bid against developers to decide how land is to be allocated. What makes such ideas untenable is that too many of the beneficiaries -future innovators and consumers in the case of unlicensed spectrum -are difficult or impossible to identify at the time of the auction. As in the case of public parks, ignorance about who the future individual users will be or what their values will be cannot justify overlooking those users and values, as would surely happen in such an auction. 5 According to our interviews with phone company executives, the growth of demand in mobile data services is driven in part by consumers' desire to extend the wireless services they have at home and in the office to be available at remote locations as well. This happens in much the same way that users of wired telephone services became the first demanders of mobile phone services. And, the ability of licensed networks to offload traffic onto unlicensed spectrum enhances those networks' capacity to provide high quality, nearly ubiquitous coverage. 6 Bykowsky, Sharkey and Olson, "Licensed vs. Unlicensed Use of Spectrum," 2.
governing the uses of radio spectrum. Section IV describes the economic value of unlicensed spectrum, both in terms of its current uses and as a platform for future innovations. Section V discusses the policy implications of our analysis, and how one might approach the problem of deciding what spectrum to leave unlicensed and how to regulate its uses. Section VI concludes.
II. History and Uses of Unlicensed Spectrum
9. Radio spectrum is the range of electromagnetic frequencies from approximately 30 kHz to 300 GHz that can be used for radio communications. 7 10. Similar applications are typically allocated in bands, which are sections of the spectrum designated for specific services. For example, the band from 4.053MHz to 4.438 is used for maritime mobile communications, the band between 512MHz and 608MHz is used for television channels 21-36, and the band from 1628.5MHz to 1660MHz is used for mobile satellites. Some of these bands are further subdivided into smaller blocks that are assigned to particular licensees (in these examples, broadcasters and mobile telephone network operators).
Radio Spectrum and Spectrum Management
In addition to supporting military and public safety applications, it is used in a wide variety of other ways. These include broadcast television and radio; navigation and aviation communications, radar, and GPS devices; computer and networking applications (e.g. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth); mobile phones; and other wireless consumer electronics such as wireless heart rate monitors, microwave ovens, baby monitors, two-way radios, and garage door openers.
11. In most countries, radio spectrum is regulated and managed by the government, which decides how to allocate bands to different applications. 13. Spectrum used by private entities can be regulated in a number of ways.
Following a common, if informal, practice, we use the term licensed spectrum to refer to frequency bands that can be used exclusively by licensed operators for a set time period.
A license typically defines the frequency ranges and geographic locations in which the spectrum can be utilized, the maximum power level to be transmitted, and other provisions. Licensees can expect to be protected from interference that would disrupt the normal operation within their licensed service areas. TV broadcasting, commercial broadcast radio, and cellular voice and data services are examples of applications that utilize licensed spectrum.
Licensed and Unlicensed Spectrum
14. Until 1982, the FCC held administrative hearings to allocate cellular licenses.
Prospective users would send applications to the FCC, and the FCC would attempt to identify which applicant would offer the greatest public benefit. In 1982, with a growing backlog of license applications, Congress authorized a lottery system, but this proved to an inefficient allocation mechanism. In 1993 Congress authorized the use of auctions, and the first US spectrum auctions took place in 1994. 9 The FCC auctions are credited with enabling new wireless entrants to establish national presence by lowering the transaction costs of obtaining sufficient spectrum. The quality and quantity of cellular services has increased rapidly since that time. Through the end of 2008, spectrum auctions also had raised $52 billion in revenue for the US government. Auctions are now the primary means of allocating radio spectrum in much of the world.
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15. We use the term unlicensed spectrum to refer to the frequency bands for which no exclusive licenses are granted and on which unregistered users potentially may operate wireless devices without specific user or device authorizations. 11 Users of these bands do not enjoy exclusivity and can be subject to interference from other users, although regulators typically restrict the transmission power in these bands to limit interference.
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The use of devices on unlicensed spectrum was authorized first by the FCC in 1938, at which point devices were approved on a case-by-case regulatory process. 18. Much of the debate regarding further allocation of unlicensed spectrum focuses on frequencies below 1000 MHz. Radio waves at these frequencies travel further and penetrate walls more easily for a given power level than those at higher frequencies.
These characteristics make many of these frequencies especially useful in both licensed and unlicensed applications, from 4G mobile services to long-range Wi-Fi. WirelessHD and WiGig use the 60 GHz unlicensed band to achieve multi-gigabit data transfer over the range of a few meters. AT&T alone has over 20,000 hotspots in the United Sates and 80,000 worldwide, 24 and had over 220 million connections to these hotspots in the first three quarters of 2010. mobile devices, exceeding the number of traditional computers. 27 The number of smartphones in use alone has exceeded 500 million in 2010. 28 Cisco projects that by 2015, almost half of IP traffic will be carried over Wi-Fi networks. 
III. The Economic Governance of Radio Spectrum
Other future Wi-Fi innovations include in-home video and Wi-Fi Direct, which is a new technology that supports the connection of mobile devices (such as mobile phones, cameras, and gaming devices) to each other without joining a traditional home or office network.
30. In its early history, radio spectrum was an example of what economists refer to a common-pool resource. A typical concern with common pool resources is the potential 28 "Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2010-2015"; Cisco White Paper (2011): Table 2. 29 "Cisco Visual Networking Index," 11.
Common Pool Resources and Property Rights
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Elizabeth Woyke, "Automatic Wi-Fi Offloading Coming to U.S. Carriers," Forbes Magazine, April 22, 2011. 31 In economic theory, a common pool resource is a resource that is non-excludable (meaning it is costly to prevent people from using it) and rivalrous (meaning that individual use can deplete the resource or interfere with its use by others).
for congestion or overuse. The concern arises because individuals may not account fully for the fact that their use impinges on others. Garrett Hardin famously called this problem the tragedy of the commons. He used the example of cattle over-grazing on common pastureland to demonstrate the problem. 32 31. The potential for congestion or overuse calls for a governance system to manage resource use. For many resources, the system that is adopted is some form of private property rights. For radio spectrum, licensing plays an analogous role. Just as private property rights in land helped to resolve the tragedy of the commons for some tracts of land, long-term licenses, by providing exclusive use and protections against incursions, can mitigate the problem for some spectrum bands. When property rights are assigned for any resource, the owner of the resource has an incentive to maximize its value and can make investments without fear that its investment will be appropriated by others. In the case of radio spectrum, a licensee obtains the ability to sell services that use the band and exclude others from using its spectrum, limiting interference. These prerogatives allow the licensee to manage congestion and provide it with an incentive to make complementary investments in building out a network. Moreover, through the sale of the license, the government is able to share in the revenue that is created.
In the case of radio spectrum, the danger is interference from conflicting signals, and the problems of the 1930s with radio interference are an example of congestion externalities.
32. Despite these merits, property rights and the analogous system of radio spectrum licenses can have several major drawbacks. One disadvantage is that the system for allocating property rights may be imperfect. The auctions currently used by the U.S. and other countries to allocate spectrum licenses have been successful in many ways, but they also have led in most countries to a highly concentrated market structure in mobile communications. This outcome is hardly surprising. A basic premise in the auction is to allocate spectrum in a way that creates value from the perspective of the bidders.
Consequently, licenses tend to be won by the firms that expect to use them most profitably and not necessarily by firms that might create competitive pressure that lowers 32 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (3859) (1968): 1243-1248.
prices. Put another way, auction theory tells us that the type of auction mechanisms used to allocate spectrum, if they work well, will tend to maximize industry profits, and one expects industry profits to be higher with more concentration. 33 33. Another drawback to property rights is that they can stifle third-party innovation:
third-party innovators face a threat of hold-up. A company that comes up with a new mobile device or business model needs to convince the owner of the spectrum to let it develop its idea, and it may have to share a large fraction of the value that is created with the spectrum owner. If the new development threatens the owner's existing business, it is particularly unlikely to be allowed. And, if the innovation requires the assent and coordination of multiple spectrum owners, it is even more difficult to get the owners all to agree. The potential for this type of coordination failure is sometimes referred to as the tragedy of the anticommons. 34. We emphasize that the innovation problem is particularly weighty when, for historical or other reasons, important innovations are most likely to be driven by diverse parties, some of whom are not necessarily the current owners of the spectrum. In the contrary circumstance, where innovation to enhance a particular asset hinges on making large investments in laboratories and other resources, ownership can enhance incentives by encouraging and protecting large investments. For radio spectrum, history suggests a mixed innovation and investment story, with licensed spectrum having been valuable to encourage the necessary network infrastructure for wireless mobile handsets and unlicensed spectrum encouraging a long series of novel, valuable, and unanticipated uses.
It has become a familiar problem in intellectual property, arising when product developers must license such a large number of patents that the process of innovation becomes cumbersome, unwieldy and inefficient.
35. A third concern with allocating property rights over spectrum is that once licenses have been allocated, reallocation tends to be a slow and difficult process. For example, even within cellular communication bands, there has been historically a very limited 33 Hazlett, Porter and Smith, "Radio Spectrum". organizations that manage common-pool resources. 35 As she emphasizes, these principles do not necessarily imply the creation of exclusive property rights; in many cases, alternative systems can work better. this regulatory approach has a number of benefits that allow unlicensed spectrum to be part of a platform for innovation and a source of services that are complementary to those created by licensed spectrum.
39. First, the availability of unlicensed spectrum can make the cost of setting up and deploying systems for local wireless transmission extremely low. There are no licensing fees to pay, no approvals to obtain, and no need for radio frequency planning. networks that use licensed spectrum. With a Skype-enabled phone, a receiver can move from place-to-place and, so long as his device is connected to a Wi-Fi network, can make calls without using the 3G networks. This is an example of how unlicensed spectrum may protect consumers from excessive market power possessed by spectrum owners.
A lack of entry barriers encourages companies to develop new products and business models, leading to innovation and competition. In contrast, the two key applications of spread spectrum techniques on licensed spectrum, namely code division multiple access (CDMA) and time division multiple access (TDMA), were not introduced in cellular networks until the mid-1990s.
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IV. Economic Benefits of Unlicensed Spectrum
42. Precisely because applications of unlicensed spectrum are so numerous, it is difficult to place a reliable economic value on their use. Nevertheless a variety of approaches all point toward economic benefits at least in the tens of billions of dollars a year. In this section we discuss some of the most significant benefits of current uses of unlicensed spectrum and estimates of their economic value. The study estimated the value of home Wi-Fi alone at between $4.3 and $12.6 billion per year, and the value of all three applications together at $16-37 billion per year. However, as pointed out by the authors, these numbers are probably far too conservative and can at most be regarded as a lower bound on the value of Wi-Fi at home. should be attributed to Wi-Fi, but consider the following. An iPad with Wi-Fi capability but no 3G capability, and with 32GB of storage, retails for $599. Analysts have put its production cost at just under half this amount. 42 That translates into a producer surplus on each sale of roughly $300, and a plausible first guess is that consumer surplus is the same magnitude. If so, the value created with each iPad sale is around $600, for a total of over $15 billion over the last year. BT uses the Wi-Fi network to offload data traffic from its wireless customers, which would otherwise suck capacity from its licensed network. A similar system is used in France, where, for example, SFR has installed 1.3 million dual-network routers, which provide a private network for the consumer and a guest network for SFR's other customers. 45 47. The Microsoft study mentioned above does not consider explicitly another major application of Wi-Fi, which is its use by mobile phone users. Today, most smartphones are equipped with Wi-Fi capabilities that enable users to transfer data using broadband internet instead of 3G. One benefit of the use of Wi-Fi on mobile phones is that it allows data transfers at much higher speeds. Another benefit is the ability to transfer data when the 3G network is unavailable. And, offloading data traffic to Wi-Fi reduces the congestion on 3G networks. Today, we estimate that about a third of all mobile data traffic is transferred through Wi-Fi. 46 48. Again, it is difficult to place an exact number on the value created by having Wi-Fi connectivity on mobile phones. One way to get a rough estimate is to assume that users attach the same value to each bit of data, whether it is transferred on the 3G would not allow them to be connected otherwise (e.g., in airports and cafes).
Value of Current Applications of Unlicensed Spectrum
51. The substantial benefits associated with unlicensed spectrum today, in particular the large value attributable to ubiquitous technologies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, suggest strongly that additional unlicensed spectrum would continue to contribute to social welfare. In this section we discuss a few of the future applications that might emerge if additional unlicensed spectrum were made available. We then return to our basic theme that unlicensed spectrum is an enabling resource that provides a means for dispersed innovators to create a variety of unanticipated products and services. While this benefit may be large and perhaps the most important, it is naturally difficult to quantify or predict with precision.
Future Applications of Unlicensed Spectrum and Its Value as an Enabling Resource
52. Some possible uses of new unlicensed spectrum already can be identified. One application is "Super Wi-Fi", which is expected to increase the range of Wi-Fi by a factor of two to three as well as allow Wi-Fi to go over hills and through walls. 47 Super Wi-Fi achieves these benefits using white spaces -the unused bands of spectrum between used channels -in the lower frequency television bands between 54 MHz and 698 MHz. 48 In order to prevent conflicts and interference, the 802.22 standard incorporates technologies such as spectrum sensing, dynamic spectrum access, and geolocation techniques. 49 One application of Super Wi-Fi is providing the "last-mile" connection in rural broadband deployment. 60. Between 1994 and 2008, the sale of spectrum licenses by the FCC produced $52 billion in revenue. This suggests a concern that creating additional unlicensed spectrum might reduce government revenues by lowering the amount of licensed spectrum available at auction. However, the reverse can also happen: additional unlicensed spectrum could increase revenue in several ways.
More Unlicensed Spectrum Need Not Imply Lower Revenues
61. First, a reduction in the supply of licensed spectrum is highly likely to increase its per-unit price. If the aggregate demand for licensed spectrum is relatively inelastic (with an elasticity between 0 and -1), a reduction in the available spectrum would, by itself, actually increase the revenue that can be expected from a given auction.
62. We are not aware of convincing estimates of the aggregate demand for licensed spectrum. Bulow, Levin and Milgrom (2009), however, have pointed out that in large spectrum auctions, the overall auction revenue tends to reflect the aggregate budgets of the participants. To the extent that telecommunications firms allocate budgets for spectrum purchases that are relatively insensitive to changes in the available spectrum, and tend to spend their budget at auction, changes in the available spectrum will have only modest effects, if any, on government revenue.
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. A second point is that complementarity between licensed and unlicensed spectrum can lead to a situation where unlicensed spectrum applications increase the demand for licensed spectrum applications and lead to higher license prices. One example is consumer wireless broadband services. The ability of smartphones and tablets to connect to Wi-Fi networks increases the value of these products to consumers, which, in turn, can increase the sales of mobile data services and therefore the revenues obtained from selling licensed spectrum. 58 64. To make an analogy, suppose that a city is planning to construct a new neighborhood and considers allocating space for a park. Would building a park instead of extra houses necessarily reduce revenues? On one hand, the city foregoes the revenues that could be obtained by selling these extra houses on the market. On the other hand, the lower availability of houses is expected to increase the price of each house, potentially reversing the impact of lower supply. The effect of lower supply of houses on the city revenues would depend on the elasticity of demand for houses. Additionally, proximity to a park would raise the value of each house in the neighborhood, increasing the city's revenues.
V. Policy Implications
65. Not all spectrum bands have the same properties. Specifically, spectrum between 10 and 1,000 MHz has great potential for longer-range, more reliable, and ultra low-power unlicensed applications requiring high data rates. In order to facilitate innovation in new services, to encourage competition from services using unlicensed spectrum for ones using licensed spectrum, and to grow complementary services using unlicensed spectrum to match those using licensed spectrum, the quality and capacity of unlicensed spectrum should grow apace.
Allocating Spectrum Bands for Unlicensed Uses
66. The availability of unlicensed spectrum must be sufficiently reliable to encourage innovators to invest in new technologies. If spectrum (or specific bands) is only sporadically available, the incentive of innovators to invest in research and development of new technologies and of manufacturers to build equipment that exploits those bands would be greatly diminished.
67. It has recently been proposed that auctions, rather than an administrative process, can serve as an effective mechanism to determine the allocation of licensed vs.
unlicensed spectrum. The basic idea is that potential beneficiaries of unlicensed spectrum would submit bids for unlicensed spectrum. The bids for unlicensed spectrum would be aggregated and compete with individual bids of market participants that compete for licensed spectrum. To prevent free-riding by the beneficiaries of unlicensed spectrum, a recent FCC working paper has proposed that a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism be used to aggregate bids and determine the allocation of spectrum and corresponding payments by auction participants. 72. The economic case for unlicensed spectrum rests in large part on there being dispersed innovation by third party innovators, but then how is the spectrum common pool to be managed? Of course, one requirement is that the pool must be large enough to allow multiple uses, including new ones, and the spectrum must be of suitable quality to support services that complement and compete with licensed wireless services.
Management of Unlicensed Spectrum
73. Given the size of the allocation, efficient common governance of a pool resource requires adopting restrictions on or etiquettes for its use. If the air's capacity to accept pollution is managed as a common pool resource, then power plants may be allowed to emit, but only with suitable emission control equipment. If fisheries are managed that way, then fishermen may be limited in the mesh size of their nets and the proximity of their boats to others in the fishery. On public tennis courts, users may be limited to one-hour sign-ups, and park users may be forbidden to play music that is too loud. Similarly, the devices that use unlicensed spectrum are subjected to restrictions on their power, their use of bandwidth, and etiquette or protocols that reduce interference with other devices. As Ostrom has emphasized, to be most effective, these regulations should be developed with the participation of those who are most affected. For that function, industry standards bodies perform a function similar to the communities in Ostrom's studies.
74. Because unlicensed devices are low-powered, another factor that contributes to efficient use is the local user, who helps to regulate the interaction of devices by turning off (or refusing to buy) devices that interfere too much with others. Together with the standards and protocols described above, the common pool regulation alternative is an effective way to promote non-interference, allowing the bands to be used efficiently.
And, as already argued, free use of the band is key to encouraging third-party innovation.
75. A variety of new technologies have enhanced unlicensed devices' ability to use spectrum effectively, and the development of these technologies suggests, in itself, pentup demand for additional and higher quality unlicensed spectrum. Dynamic white space allocation refers to techniques that allow for more efficient use of quality low-frequency spectrum. TV broadcasters typically use low frequency spectrum (between 54 and 698 MHz). TV transmitters typically broadcast at hundreds of kilowatts of power, and therefore neighboring stations use different frequencies to avoid interference. The vacant channels in the television bands between the frequencies used by incumbent stations are called white spaces. These white spaces can be used for longer range unlicensed communications that could also provide cheap "last-mile" infrastructure.
76. New "Cognitive Radio" (CR) capabilities better manage interference and help use available spectrum more efficiently. CR technologies utilize a radio frequency (RF) sensor to detect unused spectrum that is available and capable of communications. CR understands the properties inherent to the user such as battery life, signal interface, and attenuation, which are then used in a set of decision-making algorithms to provide the best capabilities for each user.
77. Cognitive radios can also change frequencies dynamically to maintain reliable communications. 62 As a result, CR helps improve the efficiency of spectrum usage. CR technologies can also be used to ensure that new unlicensed users do not interfere with TV signals: when databases of incumbent licensees are available for a given location, devices can be instructed to avoid those frequency bands. 63 Spectrum etiquette (or legally binding) rules, such as avoiding occupying a channel when there is no data being transmitted or avoiding channels where there is already a certain amount of traffic on that channel, also help to manage interference.
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VI. Conclusion
78. In our introduction, we asked a series of questions. For the first -why have the unlicensed portions of the spectrum been such an effective catalyst for innovation? -our answer is that unlicensed spectrum is an enabling resource that, like other enabling resources and technologies, encourages innovation by many parties. Licensing or ownership that limits access to such resources discourages innovation by giving too much power to the licensee or owner. 80. The continued development of unlicensed technologies is likely both to increase the value of licensed spectrum by providing complementary services and to provide a platform for competing services. These effects provide ample reason for policy makers to expand the quality and quantity of unlicensed spectrum alongside that of licensed spectrum.
81. Our last question was: Is it costly, in terms of auction revenues, to set aside some spectrum for unlicensed uses? The surprise for many will be that economic theory provides no clear answer, but we believe that the most likely answer is no. Reserving some spectrum to be unlicensed reduces the quantity available to be sold, which both raises prices and reduces quantities. So, even if unlicensed spectrum had no demandenhancing effects, the revenue effect of reserving some spectrum for unlicensed could be ambiguous. The demand-enhancing effects of unlicensed spectrum, however, have been and likely will continue to be quite large. There is a strong argument that the exploding demand for mobile data was seeded by Wi-Fi devices, and that products like tablet computers, which create huge extra demand for mobile data, could not have been introduced successfully without their Wi-Fi capabilities. If new unlicensed uses have even a fraction of this impact, then the enabling resource of unlicensed spectrum will have a hugely positive impact on the value of licensed spectrum, leading to increased auction revenues.
82. As the demand for licensed spectrum grows, it is a fair guess that the demand for equally good unlicensed spectrum will grow apace. Wise policy should allow and celebrate that sort of growth.
